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ABSTRACT
This paper discusses how optimal monetary policy is affected by differences in the combination of
shocks an economy experiences and the rigidities it exhibits.  Without both nominal rigidities and economic
shocks, monetary policy would be irrelevant. Recognizing this, policymakers increasingly incorporate the
understanding gained from new research on rigidities and shocks into both their policy actions and the
design of monetary institutions. Specifically, shocks can be predominantly real, affecting relative prices, or
primarily nominal, moving the general price level. They may also be big or small, frequent or rare. Similarly,
some nominal rigidities are symmetrical, affecting both upward and downward movements equally, while
others are asymmetrical, restricting decreases more than increases.  After reviewing major trends in the
conduct of monetary policy, we describe how the growing theoretical and empirical literature on shocks
and rigidities informs three
crucial dimensions of monetary policymaking. First, we discuss why trimmed means provide the best
measure of core inflation. Second, we outline how rigidities impede policymakers' ability to control inflation.
And third, we describe how alternative shock/rigidity combinations create inflation's grease (whereby it
improves economic efficiency by speeding adjustment) and sand effects (whereby it distorts price signals)
with their contrasting implications for the optimal level of inflation. We conclude by considering some key
implications for monetary policy.
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erica.groshen@bis.org1I N T R O D U C T I O N
If prices and wages were perfectly °exible, monetary policy would be irrelevant.
But casual observation suggests both that nominal prices and wages are at least
somewhat rigid and that monetary policy has real e®ects. Economists' understanding
of the nature of these rigidities has improved in recent years. At the same time,
policymakers have begun to incorporate economists' theoretical and empirical ¯ndings
in their institutions and actions. This paper explores the ways in which our empirical
understanding of nominal rigidities informs three key dimensions of the conduct of
monetary policy: how we measure core in°ation, how we control in°ation, and how
we choose in°ation targets.
The overriding theme of our analysis is that an understanding of the nature of
shocks and rigidities is crucial for the conduct of a sound monetary policy. Shocks
and rigidities vary along a number of dimensions. E±cient in°ation measurement,
optimal in°ation goals, and the e®ective execution of policy will all vary depending
on these aspects of an economy's structure.
To be speci¯c, shocks can be predominantly real, a®ecting relative prices, or pri-
marily nominal, moving the general price level. They may also be big or small, and
they may be frequent or rare. Di®erent economies are susceptible to very di®erent
types of shocks. For example, a country like the United States or a region like the
European Monetary Union primarily faces small background shocks. Alternatively,
Australia, a country heavily dependent on its exports of raw materials, and Norway,
an oil-producing country, are more prone to occasional large shocks.
Similarly, there are several key di®erences in rigidities. Some nominal rigidities
are symmetrical, a®ecting movements both up and down, while others exhibit more
stickiness downward. In addition, rigidities can vary in their degree. For example,
if symmetric wage and price stickiness is a result of costly adjustment (menu costs),
then economies that have recently experienced high in°ation may have implemented
price- and wage-change technologies that make individual changes less costly, result-
1ing in more frequent adjustments and a lower level of symmetric stickiness. Downward
rigidity will also vary among countries, depending, for example, on wage-setting prac-
tices.
With this in mind, we begin our analysis by noting the diversity of approaches
to the conduct of monetary policy around the world. Countries vary substantially
in their choice of regime. Some target in°ation explicitly, others target money, and
still others attempt to ¯x their exchange rates. Not surprisingly, their macroeconomic
circumstances and outcomes have varied dramatically as well. These divergences raise
questions about how various types of nominal rigidity a®ect each aspect of monetary
policy. In particular, what evidence do we have of the existence of speci¯c rigidities,
and what is the implication for the conduct of monetary policy?
The ¯rst monetary policy issue we address concerns the measurement of core, or
trend, in°ation. Rigidities cause in°ation-induced price adjustments to occur asyn-
chronously, an e®ect that introduces biases into the usual measures of price changes
and lowers the signal-to-noise ratio in such measures. Recent research has advanced
our understanding of these issues and o®ers some intriguing alternatives (such as
medians and trimmed means) to the common average index.
Second, the nature and extent of rigidities create potentially variable lags in the
monetary policy transmission mechanism, complicating the policymaker's job. The
execution of policy requires forecasts of the variables of interest | normally output
and in°ation | plus a quantitative estimate of the impact of policy changes. In
addition to obscuring the level of trend in°ation, nominal rigidities make price and
wage adjustments dependent on the actual pattern of shocks hitting the economy,
introducing considerable uncertainty into in°ation forecasts, and complicating the
measurement of the impact of policy substantially. Recent research illuminates the
nature of this challenge and suggests how we might formulate policy in the face of
this uncertainty.
Third, the nature of shocks and rigidities a®ects the level of in°ation that mone-
2tary policymakers should target. Our paper looks at two combinations of shocks and
rigidities and their contrasting implications for optimal targets. Symmetric rigidities
with nominal shocks imply that optimal in°ation should be close to zero. Downward
rigidities with real shocks imply that zero in°ation is too low a target.
We conclude our analysis by considering some implications of recent theoretical
and empirical research on wage and price rigidity for the implementation of monetary
policy. First, we suggest ways in which the in°ation trend can be more accurately
measured, and second, we address the question of how best to select an in°ation
target.
2C O N D U C T O F M O N E T A R Y P O L I C Y
The decade of the 1990s has seen a convergence in the goals and methods used for
the conduct of monetary policy around the world. A number of forces have driven
this development. First, during the high in°ation of the 1970s and 1980s, many
countries saw prices rise well in excess of 50 percent per year for extended periods.1
This experience led to a clear consensus that even moderate levels of in°ation damage
real growth and that low in°ation must therefore be a primary objective of monetary
policy. Casual observation suggests that low-in°ation countries experience higher
growth rates, and so there are strong incentives to devise ways in which to keep
in°ation low.2
Second, evidence indicates that in most countries, short-run money demand func-
tions are unstable and so meaningful measures of money, such as M3, are very di±-
cult to control. As a result, monetary targeting alone is no longer viewed as a viable
strategy for stabilizing prices. Finally, excessive exchange rate volatility is seen as
damaging. The discussion about the appropriate exchange rate regime is clearly on-
1Examples include Bolivia, Israel, and Argentina.
2The literature on the connection between in°ation and growth is large and growing, with less
than robust results. Andr¶ es and Hernando (1999) is a recent example.
3going, but a shrinking cohort of countries organize their policy framework with the
goal of reducing or eliminating °uctuations in the value of their currency relative to
that of some anchor country. Since these anchor countries typically have low in°ation,
this strategy calls for maintaining similar low rates.
As consensus has grown on these issues, many countries have redesigned their
central banks and, for the most part, achieved remarkable reductions in in°ation.3
A survey of 77 countries reported in Morand¶ e and Schmidt-Hebbel (1999) divides
countries into three groups on the basis of their monetary policy regime: exchange
rate targeting, monetary targeting, or in°ation targeting. The recent trend favors
explicit or implicit in°ation targeting. At least ten countries or central banks now set
explicit in°ation targets that clearly dominate any other targets or objectives. These
countries are New Zealand, which in 1988 became the ¯rst industrialized country to
adopt an explicit \hard" in°ation target; Canada, Chile, and Israel, which adopted
in°ation targeting in 1991; the United Kingdom, which moved to explicit in°ation
targets in 1992; and Australia and Sweden, which changed their policy frameworks
in 1993; the Czech Republic and Spain which adopted targets in 1994 and 1995,
respectively; and the European Central Bank, which announced a target in 1999.
Morand¶ e and Schmidt-Hebbel (1999) list a total of 45 countries that, over the past
decade, have adopted some form of in°ation target: 12 industrialized, 12 transitional
and 21 developing.4 Similarly, many other countries have changed their monetary
regimes to target monetary aggregates or exchange rates with the goal of creating a
credible low in°ation policy.5
3Mishkin (1999) provides a discussion of the recent international experience of various monetary
regimes.
4In their Table 1, Morand¶ e and Schmidt-Hebbel (1999) also identify 34 countries that target
primarily money and 36 that target exchange rates.
5The political economy of monetary policy and the importance of credibility have been widely
studied. The research in this area has focused on the importance of a structure in which the
central bank is independent of the elected o±cials in the government. See, for example, Alesina and
Summers (1993). With independence of operation comes the need for central banks to be accountable
for their performance, usually relative to an in°ation objective set by statute or agreement with other
branches of government.
4Regardless of the speci¯c target a country chooses for implementing monetary
policy, central banks face a number of practical di±culties in maintaining low levels
of in°ation. In°ation-targeting countries must specify an index to target, set a level
for the target, decide whether to state the target as a band (for example, between
zero and two percent) or as a point, and choose the number of quarters or years
over which the target will be averaged. Similar choices must be made by countries
that target money or exchange rates. These practical decisions are best based on a
solid theoretical and empirical understanding of the processes underlying in°ation.
Fortunately, in recent years, economic research has shed considerable light on these
processes. The next three sections of this paper survey what we now know about
core in°ation measurement, in°ation control, and the choice of an optimal long-term
in°ation level.
3 CORE INFLATION MEASUREMENT
Before policymakers can hope to control in°ation, they must measure it; prefer-
ably on a timely basis.6 This is a di±cult task that has attracted substantial at-
tention among both academic and central bank economists.7 One of the primary
di±culties associated with the measurement of in°ation is the presence of consider-
able amounts of transitory noise.8 That is, monthly or quarterly in°ation readings
can di®er signi¯cantly from the longer term trend in in°ation. A few numbers provide
6Throughout this section, we assume that measurement of core in°ation is a statistical problem
associated with the estimation of a long-run trend movements in prices. Other conceptions are
surely possible, all of which would be based on structural economic models. For example, Quah and
Vahey (1995), motivated by the concept of a long-run vertical Phillips curve, de¯ne core in°ation to
be the component of measured in°ation that has no impact on real output in the long run. We shy
away from such de¯nitions, as they are highly parametric and therefore unlikely to provide timely
evidence on structural breaks in the in°ation process.
7The literature on core in°ation, now vast, began with Eckstein (1981). Wynne (1999) provides
a recent survey.
8A second di±culty is the presence of bias in price indexes. For recent work in this area, see the
survey in Shapiro and Wilcox (1996).
5some perspective. Over the past ¯fteen years, the standard deviation of (annualized)
monthly changes in the U.S. Consumer Price Index has been 2.2 percentage points.
Meanwhile, the 12-month changes have had a standard deviation that is half that
value, or 1.1 percent; and the 36-month moving average has had a standard deviation
of only 0.8. Clearly the monthly changes in consumer prices provide only limited
information about the trend.
The experience of the ¯rst half of 1999 provides an excellent example of how
noisy and confusing monthly CPI movements can be. The monthly readings varied
between zero (there was no change from April to May) and nearly 9 percent (from
March to April) at an annual rate. All the while, the trend was very likely somewhere
between 2 and 3 percent per year. Although this example is surely extreme, it points
out a serious practical problem. How far do monthly or quarterly aggregate price
indexes have to move away from the perceived trend in in°ation before policymakers
change their view of the trend? Put another way, when and how should monetary
policymakers respond to what look initially like short-term in°ation changes?
To address these issues, we ¯rst need to identify the sources of this noise. Once
we have this information, we can start to ¯nd ways of reducing the noise in our
measured indexes. Experience suggests that transitory moves in price indexes are
often attributable to clearly discernible events. We can distinguish among three
di®erent types of transitory CPI noise. These are summarized in Table 1, and we
now describe them further.
First, in°ationary price changes are not uniform. That is, di®erent prices adjust
at di®erent times because nominal price adjustment is costly and adjustment costs
di®er across products. Prices which are costly to change (such as rents) will be more
rigid, that is they will change less often, but by larger increments when they do. This
variation leads to divergent in°ation measures across products and time even if the
trend is unchanged.
Second, relative price changes (re°ecting real shocks) can temporarily a®ect mea-
6Table 1: Three Sources of Noise in In°ation Measurement
Shock Rigidity Noise
Asynchronous Nominal, aggregate Symmetric wage/ Flexible price sectors
price changes price movements price rigidity adjust ¯rst, rigid
sectors lag
Incomplete Real relative Symmetric wage/ Flexible price sectors
adjustment to wage/price price rigidity adjust ¯rst, rigid
real shocks shock sectors lag; or sectors
directly a®ected adjust
¯rst, others lag
Downward wage/ Positive changes occur
price rigidity ¯rst, negative ones lag
Flaws in Change in Symmetric Seasonal adjustment
seasonal timing of timing rigidity itself yields sectoral
adjustment seasonal changes that are
events temporarily over- or
or understated
sures of in°ation even if they are not associated with a nominal shock. Some sectors
may be a®ected more rapidly than others because they are directly exposed, or be-
cause they have more °exible prices. In addition, if prices are rigid downwards, then
upward price movements will occur before the compensating downward adjustments.
Broad-based resource shocks, such as variation in petroleum prices, will have widely
divergent e®ects on the prices of di®erent consumer goods, and these do not all occur
simultaneously. Exchange-rate shifts also a®ect prices di®erently; the prices of im-
ported and import-competing goods are much more likely to change quickly than the
prices of nontraded goods and services. Moreover, the size and timing of real shocks
di®er across sectors, leading to heterogeneous price changes.
Finally, because the CPI is measured on a monthly basis, inexact seasonal adjust-
ment can also add noise to in°ation measures. Firms with high costs of adjustment
7will limit the frequency with which they change prices. When these adjustments are
coordinated among ¯rms within a sector, they produce recurrent patterns. In order
to reveal movements in the trend, statistical agencies use various adjustment tech-
niques to remove normal seasonal °uctuations from the monthly numbers. However,
these techniques are not foolproof. In particular, minor changes in the timing of
price adjustments | say, a decision by apparel manufacturers to change the prices
of summer clothes in February rather than March one year | can confound seasonal
adjustment. In that case, February would record a jump in in°ation matched by a
corresponding drop in March.
These observations suggest that prices from di®erent sectors of the economy will
contain di®erent amounts of information about in°ation trends. There is considerable
variation both in the importance of shocks and in the degree of nominal rigidity. Some
industries are more prone to large relative price movements than others, and some
product prices are easier to change. Measuring the in°ation trend requires that we
sort out the real shocks from the nominal ones on an economy-wide basis, taking
account of these potentially large cross-sectional di®erences.
A common strategy used to estimate core in°ation is to systematically remove
certain components of the price indexes. In the United States, it is standard to remove
food and energy prices, both of which appear substantially more volatile than prices
of other goods and services. The rationale is that short-term movements in these
prices stem from rapid adjustment to frequent real shocks that are often reversed,
and so they contain substantially less information about the long-term trend.
Returning to the experience of early 1999, we can see the bene¯ts of excluding
food and energy prices when trying to gauge the in°ation trend. The highest reading
of the CPI excluding food and energy is again from March to April, but the increase
is estimated at just 4 3/4 percent (at an annual rate). The lowest reading is from
January to February, and is slightly below 0.7 percent at an annual rate. By excluding
food and energy, the range of in°ation readings over this brief ¯ve-month period is
8reduced by more than one-half, from nearly 9 percent to just over 4 percent.
Still, the strategy of excluding food and energy relies on two arbitrary assumptions:
that food and energy prices never contain information about the in°ation trend,
and that other prices always do. Neither of these assumptions is likely to be true.
An alternative approach would be to look to economic theory for guidance on how
we might construct measures of trend or core in°ation. This strategy, adopted in
a series of papers by Bryan and Cecchetti,9 is based on the observation that the
economy is, roughly speaking, composed of two groups of price setters. The ¯rst
have °exible prices in the sense that they set their prices every period in response
to realized changes in the economy. Common examples include producers of fruits,
vegetables, and motor fuel. The second group of price setters, by contrast, set prices
infrequently, and face potentially high costs of readjustment. For example, we are
thinking about those who set prices for housing rentals, restaurant meals or magazines
at the newsstand.10 New Keynesian macroeconomic theory focuses on this second
group in building models in which, as a result of sticky prices and menu costs, purely
nominal disturbances have potentially long-lived real e®ects. The ¯rst group, the
realization-based price setters, have the potential to create noise in standard price
indexes. Because they can change their prices quickly and often, these ¯rms have
little reason to care about long-term trends in aggregate in°ation. In sectors where
prices are costly to change, price setters cannot correct mistakes quickly, and so the
paths of their prices are much smoother. Prices set by these expectations-based price
setters contain information about the trend that is not present in the °exible prices
of the ¯rst group.
To give some indication of the relative volatility of di®erent prices, we have com-
puted some simple standard deviations from monthly component price indexes. Look-
ing at the period since 1985, we ¯nd that the highest variation is in the prices of fuel
9See Bryan and Cecchetti (1994) and Bryan, Cecchetti, and Wiggins (1997).
10Cecchetti (1986) provides evidence of the rigidities in the price of one such good: magazines.
9oil (for home heating), motor fuel (for cars), and fruits and vegetables. The stan-
dard deviation of monthly changes in in°ation in these commodities (measured at
an annual rate) ranges from 23 percent for the food stu®s to 45 percent for fuel oil.
This is between 10 and 20 times the standard deviation in the overall CPI. At the
other end of the spectrum are \food away from home" (restaurant meals) and shelter
(which largely measures housing rental costs, or the rental equivalent value of home
ownership){the only two signi¯cant components with less volatility than the overall
CPI.
These observations have led to the development of a new set of price measures that
combine existing price data di®erently. The logic, as described in Bryan and Cec-
chetti (1994), is straightforward. Each ¯rm in the economy adjusts prices taking into
account anticipated future developments. Following an initial adjustment, previously
unanticipated shocks hit the economy. These real shocks create the desire for relative
price adjustments. Only some ¯rms experience shocks that are large enough to make
immediate adjustment worthwhile. As a result, the observed change in the aggregate
price level will depend on the shape of the distribution of the desired adjustments. In
particular, if this distribution is skewed (as often seems to be the case in practice),
then the aggregate price level will move up or down temporarily. Once every ¯rm
adjusts its prices, this transitory movement in the aggregate index disappears.11
T h ep r o p o s e ds o l u t i o nt ot h ep r o b l e mo fn o i s ec r e a t e db yi n f r e q u e n ta n da s y n -
chronous adjustment (in the absence of downward price rigidity) is to use alternative
statistical procedures for combining the disaggregated in°ation information. The
standard methodology for computing the aggregate CPI is to construct a weighted
average of price data, in which the weights are based on expenditure surveys. But the
sample mean is only one potential estimate of the central tendency of a distribution.
11If there is signi¯cant downward rigidity, and a signi¯cant number of ¯rms would wish to lower
their prices, the problem is even more severe. The process of complete adjustment can be very slow,
and in the meantime the aggregate price level can move signi¯cantly, making real shocks look like
nominal ones.
10An alternative is to use the (weighted) median of the component in°ation data, as
well as measures called trimmed means.12 Trimmed means are a generalization of the
concept of a median. A sample of data is ¯rst ordered, as it is in the construction
of the median, and then some percentage of the highest and lowest observations are
eliminated while the remainder are averaged. For example, if one has 100 sample
data points, then the computation of a 15 percent trimmed mean involves averaging
the 70 observations in the center of the distribution.13
Trimmed means are a natural solution to the di±culties created by nominal rigidi-
ties. In contrast to the average CPI excluding food and energy (which assumes that all
noise comes from two sectors), the trimmed mean assumes that any extreme change is
probably noise, no matter what sector it comes from. That is, the trimmed mean fo-
cuses on the center of the distribution to tell us what the trend is doing. As noted just
above, when ¯rms face costs of price adjustment, and the desired price changes are
skewed, then the aggregate price index will contain transitory movements re°ecting
the fact that only price setters who wish to make large moves will ¯nd it worth paying
the cost. Substitution of a trimmed mean or the median for the sample average will
reduce this source of noise and improve the signal policymakers need.
To see the di®erence this can make, we return to a comparison of the median
CPI with the all-items CPI and the CPI excluding food and energy. Looking at the
median in the ¯rst few months of 1999, we see that the lowest reading is 1.3 percent
from February to March, and the highest reading is 3.6 percent, from March to April,
both at an annual rate. Thus, the range for the all-items CPI is nearly 9 percent,
for the CPI excluding food and energy, it is 4 percent, and for the median it is 2.3
12Wynne (1999) discusses several other alternatives, including weighting individual prices by the
inverse of their estimated variance. A procedure ¯rst suggested by Dow (1994).
13Bryan, Cecchetti, and Wiggins (1997) discuss a statistical rationale for computing trimmed
means. They note that a trimmed mean can be a more e±cient, reduced-variance estimator of the
true mean when the underlying distribution of the data has fat tails. In°ation data generally exhibit
very high kurtosis relative to the normal distribution, suggesting that trimmed means can provide
improvements.
11percent. Moreover, the standard deviation in monthly in°ation for the past ¯fteen
years is 2.1 percent for the all-item CPI, 1.4 percent for the CPI excluding food and
energy, and 1.3 percent for the median (again, all values are at an annual rate). We
will simply note that it is possible to improve on this last measure by choosing the
trimmed mean that minimizes monthly variation.
An in°ation-targeting regime needs both an appropriate, transparent target and
timely information about the trend in that measure. The research cited above suggests
that trimmed means provide superior timely measures of trend in°ation. However,
the public is unfamiliar with this measure. Thus, adoption of a trimmed mean might
not o®er the transparency desirable in an in°ation goal. If so, how can these ¯ndings
be incorporated into an in°ation targeting regime? We o®er two possibilities. The
¯rst is to have the measure produced, announced and explained by a statistical agency
independent of the central bank. This role for a disinterested party should alleviate
most concerns and increase understanding of the rationale for the unfamiliar measure.
Alternatively, a central bank could maintain an average CPI target, but rely on the
trimmed mean as the best short-run monitoring device for tracking trends. Since the
advantage of the trimmed mean lies in its lower sensitivity to noise, while preserving
the trend (as captured in long-run averages), this tack is theoretically sound. In
either case, transparency and sound monetary policy both dictate the need for an
extensive study of the dynamic and long-run relationship between the trimmed mean
and average CPI in their country. Then, the central bank must be prepared to explain
policy decisions in light of both measures.
Many central banks now compute a number of alternative estimates of core in°a-
tion, including medians and trimmed means. ¶ Alvarez and de los Llanos Matea (1999)
cite numerous examples. We note here several interesting empirical regularities. First,
for the dozen or so countries for which we have seen data, the median signi¯cantly re-
duces high-frequency noise. Second, we note that for countries other than the United
States, the median appears to be systematically below the mean. The reason for
12this second ¯nding is that, outside the United States, cross-section distributions of
long-run price changes are positively skewed. This could suggest greater downward
rigidities in those countries, but fuller explanation of the ¯nding will require further
research.
4 INFLATION CONTROL
It is generally agreed that all central banks should strive to reduce in°ation and
keep it at low levels. While the measurement of in°ation poses substantial challenges,
these seem minor in comparison with the di±culties of controlling in°ation.
In°ation control can be thought of as a fairly technical problem in which the
policymaker uses an instrument such as an interest rate to meet an in°ation (or
output growth) objective.14 To carry out such a task, the policymakers must have a
substantial amount of information. Most importantly the policymaker needs to know
what will happen to the objective (in°ation) in the absence of any policy action,
as well as what the impact of any particular action on the objective will be. Thus,
in°ation control requires forecasts of in°ation and estimates of the response of in°ation
to changes in interest rates. Neither of these is straightforward to obtain.
Forecasting in°ation is a daunting task. For example, over the past decade, the
standard deviation of forecast errors in professional forecasters' predictions of U.S.
in°ation one year ahead has been about 1 full percentage point, implying a 90 per-
cent con¯dence band of about 3 percentage points. Over this same period, in°ation
has averaged only about 3 percent. Nothing seems to forecast in°ation very well,
except in°ation's own history.15 Indeed, the relationship between price in°ation and
any potential indicator{such as wages, unemployment, or commodity prices{is very
unstable. Theory provides us with a reason for the di±culty of forecasting: When
14Cecchetti (1998) discusses this problem in detail, noting that the objective is usually expressed
in terms of a trade-o® between output and in°ation variability.
15See Cecchetti (1995).
13monetary policy regimes change, the relationship among various quantities in the
economy shift as well, rendering prior statistical regularities unreliable.
From here the problem only gets worse. Not only is it di±cult to forecast in°ation,
but our ability to predict the e®ect of monetary policy actions on in°ation (and
output) is very limited. A number of researchers have estimated the response of prices
to interest rate movements in many countries. The ¯rst di±culty is in getting the
estimates to display the proper sign. Most of us have a fairly ¯rm belief that increases
in interest rates are consistent with monetary contractions and should eventually
drive in°ation down. Unfortunately, it is more di±cult than one would think to
obtain this empirical result in standard models.16 Then, beyond the di±culty of
obtaining the proper sign, lie the issues of precision and statistical signi¯cance. For
example, using a simple four-variable model (encompassing output, aggregate prices,
commodity prices, and the federal funds rate), one can estimate that a 100 basis point
increase in interest rates will drive in°ation down by about one-half of one percentage
point after three years. But two standard deviation bands on this estimate go from
approximately plus 1 percent to minus 1 3/4 percent.17
Why is it so di±cult to estimate the e®ects of monetary policy actions? The answer
is both that the economy responds to di®erent shocks in di®erent ways, and that
the economy's response depends on history, so the same shock will prompt di®erent
reactions at di®erent times. Textbook discussions treat the transmission mechanism
as invariant to the path by which the economy has arrived at its current state. This
is surely not true. Consider for a minute the implications of costly price adjustment.
A large monetary shock will lead all ¯rms to adjust and thus could result in smaller
real e®ects than a small nominal shock that causes incomplete adjustment. The path
of such shocks matters as well. Standard tools for estimating the economy's response
to monetary policy actions are ill-suited to capturing the nonlinear responses that
16See Sims (1992) for a discussion of the problem that has come to be known as the price puzzle.
17These estimates are derived from Cecchetti (1996).
14theoretical models suggest should be pervasive. As the literature makes clear, linear
approximations do not work well. Rigidities obscure both trend in°ation and the
impact of policy actions from the policymaker's view.
Policy is made every day, and so despairing over our lack of knowledge and the
inadequacies of our models is pointless. Instead, the most productive course is to
take seriously the need to make policy in an uncertain and unstable environment.
The imprecision of our knowledge must be built into the fundamentals of our policy-
making procedures.
5 THE OPTIMAL RATE OF INFLATION
Higher prices or faster in°ation can diminish involuntary, disequilib-
rium unemployment....The economy is in perpetual...disequilibrium even
when it has settled into a stochastic macro-equilibrium....[When wages are
rigid downward] price in°ation...is a neutral method of making arbitrary
money wage paths conform to the realities of productivity growth.
James Tobin, `In°ation and Unemployment,' American Economic As-
sociation Presidential Address (1972).
[Higher, more variable in°ation causes: a] reduction in the capacity of
the price system to guide economic activity; distortions in relative prices
because of the introduction of greater friction, as it were, in all markets;
and very likely, a higher recorded rate of unemployment.
Milton Friedman, `In°ation and Unemployment,' Nobel Lecture (1977).
Who is right? Widespread reductions in core in°ation and the growing use of
explicit or implicit in°ation targets by central banks make this question particularly
relevant. Is the most economically e±cient level of price changes zero, as Friedman
suggests, or something greater than zero, as Tobin implies? The answer depends both
on the structural rigidities in the economy and on the type of shocks the economy
15faces. But while the e®ectiveness of monetary policy depends on the nature of nominal
rigidities, and the task of the policymaker is to respond to external shocks, not all
rigidities and not all shocks are created the same. Di®erences in the types of shocks
to which a country is prone and the types of rigidities built into that country's wage-
and price-setting institutions will in°uence the optimal low-in°ation goal.
Both the resolution of the controversy between Friedman and Tobin and the im-
plications of this controversy for the choice of an optimal in°ation target depend on
the extent to which shocks are real or nominal, predominantly big or small; and the
degree to which prices and wages are more rigid downward than up, and more or less
sticky. A substantial amount of research has been devoted to these issues.18 Tobin's
a r g u m e n th a sb e e nc a l l e dt h egrease e®ect: a certain amount of in°ation bene¯ts eco-
nomic performance in labor and product markets by allowing greater wage and price
°exibility in the face of presumed downward rigidities. Maintaining the metaphor
of the economy as a geared machine, we use the term \sand" to refer to Friedman's
characterization of the a®ects of in°ation: in this view, in°ation interferes with the
transmission of price signals, disrupting the smooth operation of the economy. We
now turn to a discussion of each of these e®ects, which we summarize in Table 2.
5.1 How In°ation Impairs Economic E±ciency: Sand
The case for an optimal in°ation level of zero (or lower) is based on the belief that
the grease e®ects of in°ation are small while the sand e®ects are big. In a world where
wage and price rigidities cause asynchronous adjustment to shocks, in°ation results in
ine±cient idiosyncratic price or wage adjustments and relative price distortions. This
18The bulk of this work centers on the labor market, as this is presumed to be the source of
some of the most important nominal rigidities in the economy. Researchers tend to focus on wages
for a number of reasons. First, labor accounts for two-thirds of production costs. Second, casual
observation suggests that nominal wages are stickier than goods prices. Finally, wage data are more
readily available than price data, making analysis easier.
16Table 2: Comparisons of In°ation's Grease and Sand E®ects
in the Labor Market
Sand Grease
Rigidities Symmetric: menu costs; Asymmetric: downward




Shocks Nominal, aggregate price Real relative
movements wage/price shocks
In°ation's Disruptive-distorts relative Bene¯cial-speeds wage
welfare e®ects wages and prices, and price adjustments,
misdirecting resources redirecting resources quickly
Limits on None or cost of indexation Size of real shocks
welfare e®ects
Price or wage Intra-market (within Inter-market (across
di®erentials a®ected products/skill-groups, products, inputs or
across companies) skill groups)
17is the Friedman sand.19 The rigidities involved are symmetrical in that the costs of
equal-sized upward or downward movements (in response to a change in the aggregate
price level) are the same.
There are several reasons why ¯rms might adjust di®erently to the same nominal
shock, causing relative prices to vary. These include forecast disagreement, due to
uncertainty;20 menu costs that result in episodic rather than continuous adjustment,
(such as negotiating, advertising, and design costs);21 factors that make it di±cult
for consumers to comparison-shop (such as hard-to-gauge quality di®erences);22 and
contractual obligations such as collective bargaining agreements or leases. Asyn-
chronous adjustment means that aggregate price movements are not transmitted in-
stantaneously or uniformly, so market participants confuse adjustment lags or errors
with real shocks. This misunderstanding has two e®ects. First, and most obviously,
pricing errors result in resource misallocations. The second e®ect arises because peo-
ple anticipate that resource misallocations will occur. The potential for arbitrary
relative price movements creates risk that will lead ¯rms to purchase insurance of
various forms. For example, a ¯rm may choose to build a smaller factory in order to
guard against the possibility of variable pro¯t streams. There is evidence that higher
levels of in°ation are associated with increases in this type of risk.23
We can conclude that asynchronous price and wage adjustment in the presence
of in°ation creates two complementary problems. First, it makes it di±cult for poli-
cymakers to measure in°ation accurately and expeditiously; second, it misleads eco-
nomic agents. In the labor market, unintended wage changes alter ¯rms' wages rel-
19Friedman has also argued that since the marginal producing cost of money is (nearly) zero,
the social welfare maximizing level of real balances sets the nominal interest rate to zero. Optimal
in°ation is then minus the equilibrium real rate of interest. In our view, such a target would be
extremely dangerous, since it dramatically increases the probability that policy errors force the real
interest rate up unintentionally, since nominal interest rates will not be able to fall. For a further
discussion on this point, see Cecchetti (1998b).
20See Friedman (1977).
21See Sheshinski and Weiss (1977).
22Stigler and Kindahl (1970) and Reinsdorf (1994).
23See Vining and Elwertowski (1976) and Huizinga (1993).
18ative to the market and can produce unnecessary layo®s, workforce dissatisfaction,
or resignations. These wage changes can also impose additional costs by compelling
¯rms to improve information or increase the frequency of adjustments.
The conclusion at this point is clear. If all shocks were nominal and rigidities were
symmetrical, then the optimal level of in°ation would be zero. In this environment,
any positive level of in°ation would disrupt price signals, and the higher the in°ation
the worse the disruptions. These costs could be mitigated by indexing or by policies
aimed at improving forecasts; but these solutions themselves would redirect resources
from more productive uses. De°ation would have identical e®ects, leading us to
conclude that price stability would be most e±cient.24
5.2 How In°ation Overcomes Rigidities: Grease
If shocks are predominantly real, creating a desire for ¯rms and workers to adjust
relative prices and wages, and nominal wages and prices are more rigid downward
than upward, then the conclusion changes dramatically. In this case, prices, and
therefore resource allocations, adjust slowly and ine±ciently to shocks, and small
amounts of in°ation provide the means for the necessary adjustment by reducing real
product prices or workers' real pay without a cut in the corresponding nominal prices
or wages. This is the world of Tobin's grease e®ect.
There are a number of potential explanations for the presence of downward nom-
inal rigidity. Chief among them is the view that social or bureaucratic norms dis-
courage ¯rms from either cutting the wages of good workers who face unfavorable
market conditions or lowering the prices of goods with falling demand. This is the
view originally expressed by Keynes, who thought that wage stickiness re°ected social
notions of fairness. Alternative explanations are based on the existence of long-term,
24Some economists contend that the tax distortions created by in°ation reduce the level of output
permanently, and from this concludes that the optimal level of in°ation is negative. The relationship
of in°ation to public ¯nance is beyond the narrow scope of our essay.
19nominal contracts (for example, for debt or wages) or money illusion (that is, workers
resist cuts in their dollar earnings more than they resist equivalent rises in the prices
of what they buy).25
The common view is that nominal prices are less downwardly rigid than nominal
wages because products themselves are not in°uenced by social norms, nominal con-
tracts or money illusion. However, the producers and distributors that set prices may
well be subject to the same in°uences that a®ect ¯rms setting wages since product
sales represent income to them, just as wages do to workers. As a result, downward
nominal rigidity may extend beyond the labor market and, to at least some degree,
be present everywhere.
Clearly, in an environment where cutting nominal prices or wages is di±cult,
in°ation can play an important role. Following a real shock, ¯rms may be faced
with a need to reduce relative prices or wages. If they are unable to do so, ¯rms
will eventually respond by reducing production and employment. In°ation relaxes
downward wage and price rigidity because as other prices rise, ¯rms can e®ectively
lower real wages or prices without imposing nominal cuts. With this grease in place,
wage and price signals travel more rapidly through the economy, reducing layo®s,
providing more accurate incentives to workers choosing careers, and raising overall
production while reducing its volatility. Thus, in°ation reduces cyclical unemploy-
ment. An important corollary discussed in Tobin (1972) and further formalized by
Akerlof, Dickens and Perry (1996), extends this reasoning to economies facing con-
tinual small \background" disturbances. In that case, in°ation reduces steady-state
unemployment.
Returning to the question at hand, we ¯nd again that the conclusion is clear.
In an economy with downward wage and price rigidity and real shocks, the output-
maximizing (unemployment-minimizing) level of in°ation will be somewhere above
zero. It follows directly that the larger and more prevalent the shocks, the more
25See Haley (1990) for a review of the theories underlying downward wage rigidity.
20bene¯cial is in°ation, and the higher the in°ation rate should be to maximize output.
By the same token, however, in°ation beyond that needed to accommodate these
adjustments adds no further bene¯ts.
Surely, however, the conclusions reached by looking exclusively at either the sand-
induced costs or the grease-generated bene¯ts of in°ation are unrealistic. We expect
that the two e®ects can and do coexist.26 That is, economies can sustain both real and
nominal shocks and have varying degrees of downward nominal rigidities. The optimal
in°ation goal depends on the balance between the nature of the shocks and rigidities
in the economy. Thus, it is crucial that policymakers be aware of the empirical
relevance of each e®ect to their current situation.
5.3 Empirical Research on Rigidities and In°ation
How can we detect the relative size of the grease and sand e®ects in order to
help ¯x an in°ation goal? The task seems di±cult because both raise the variance of
relative price changes. But, as shown in Table 2, two key di®erences are potentially
observable. Increased price-change variability from sand's disruptions should be sym-
metrical and should occur even among the prices of otherwise identical goods. Thus,
sand can be measured in studies of in°ation's impact on intramarket (same-good)
price changes. By contrast, the grease e®ect of in°ation allows an economy to adjust
to shocks that alter the relative wages (prices) of di®erent skill groups (products).
Hence, the grease e®ect is observed when in°ation raises the dispersion of intermar-
ket (that is, between skill-group or product) wage and price changes. In addition,
its impact may be asymmetrical, as it facilitates downward movements more than
upward ones.
26Groshen and Schweitzer (1996) demonstrate this formally in a model of the labor market.
21Measures of Sand E®ects
The sand phenomenon has been studied in both the goods and the labor mar-
ket. Sand studies gauge in°ation's costs by measuring its tendency to raise intramar-
ket prices unevenly.
Recent research on price adjustment variability uses narrow product micro data.
Some studies consider price changes in a single class of goods, generally in low-in°ation
countries;27 others have explored price changes for a wide variety of goods in high-
in°ation environments.28 Examining price changes in the United States during high
in°ation years (1980-82), Reinsdorf (1994) ¯nds that the variation in prices within a
single product category rose when in°ation fell unexpectedly. The variation of price
changes across product categories, however, was positively correlated with in°ation,
and so it fell. More support for the sand hypothesis comes from the observed tendency
of in°ation to raise forecast price-change dispersion.29 On balance, these studies agree
that price change and forecast variability rise with in°ation, as predicted by the sand
story.
Research using aggregate data on wages, however, seems to contradict the sand
hypothesis. A number of studies ¯nd that the dispersion of wage changes fell as
in°ation rose in the late 1970s and early 1980s.30 This seemingly contradictory result
is attributed to the in°ation-induced introduction of indexation, which makes wage
changes more uniform across industries by tying them more closely to price in°ation.
In addition, since the datasets used in these studies leave investigators with a limited
ability to control for business cycle variation in worker skill levels and workforce
composition, the authors may be confusing intramarket sand e®ects with intermarket
grease e®ects.
27See Cecchetti (1986) for magazines' cover prices.
28See Lach and Tsiddon (1992)
29See Ball and Cecchetti (1990).
30See the survey in Groshen and Schweitzer (1997) for discussion of these ¯ndings.
22The work of Groshen and Schweitzer (1996, 1999) reexamines this question using
transaction-level data over a long time period. Their data set includes detailed infor-
mation on occupation, and so allows for the type of controls that e®ectively replicate
the comparability across goods (intramarket variability) sought in the product-price
literature. They ¯nd that, over the full observed range of 1 to 14 percent, more in-
°ation raises the variation of intramarket wage changes. Moreover, further increases
in in°ation appear to increase costs without bound.
Measures of Grease E®ects
The original research investigating the existence of asymmetrical nominal rigidi-
ties examined aggregate time-series data. Testing whether aggregate real wages are
procyclical (as implied by downward wage rigidity), investigators have concluded that
wages (in the United States) are probably rigid downward.31 However, these results
have been challenged by theorists who have provided models with identical predictions
but fully °exible wages and prices.32
The response to this challenge has been to examine micro-level data and employ
tests that are immune to the earlier criticisms. This research program provides more
direct evidence in support of the hypothesis that wages are rigid downward. Some
studies examine this question using household survey data and ¯nd evidence of sub-
stantial nominal wage cuts, which they take to contradict the existence of downward
rigidity. But the data are plagued by various measurement errors that may drive the
conclusions.33 More important, even if we take the evidence of these studies at face
value, the existence of nominal wage cuts is neither necessary nor su±cient to demon-
strate that wages are fully °exible, since we do not know how many wage cuts are
needed to ensure e±cient allocation of resources. Furthermore, the results obtained
31For a more detailed review of the results referred to in this section, see the survey in Groshen
and Schweitzer (1997).
32The earliest example we know of is Lucas and Rapping (1969).
33Of particular concern is the fact that the data collection methods rely on individuals' memories
and third-party reporting, creating large systematic errors in the measures of wage change.
23from looking at household survey data are contradicted by evidence obtained from
interviewing employers and workers on the job. Employers report that their wage-
setting policies have important downward rigidities built into them, and workers seem
to agree. The studies all provide evidence that wages are downwardly rigid. Nominal
wages are not cut unless there is explicit provision for °exible wages (such as through
piece-rate or incentive systems) or the ¯rm is under demonstrable ¯nancial distress.
More recent microeconometric studies, based on longitudinal datasets that allow
investigators to control more fully for mismeasurement, detect evidence of downward
rigidity in spikes at zero and the implied positive skewness of wage changes.34 While
spikes at zero or positive skewness of wage changes are neither necessary nor su±-
cient signs of downward rigidity, they add to the evidence in support of the grease
hypothesis.35
Studies of ¯rm-level micro data take another approach to looking for downward
nominal rigidities. Transaction-level data on wages paid by ¯rms re°ect employ-
ers' strategies to avoid downward wage rigidity and are not in°uenced by worker
misreporting. Using such data, Groshen and Schweitzer (1996, 1999) ¯nd evidence
consistent with downward wage rigidity and determine that the e®ect of in°ation on
wage changes is exhausted at in°ation levels of about 7 to 9 percent | consistent
with the notion that grease bene¯ts are bounded. Using employer data from the
Employment Cost Index, Lebow, Saks and Wilson (1999) ¯nd additional evidence of
downward wage rigidity.
In sum, while each individual micro or macro test may not be fully convincing on
its own, taken together the tests provide diverse and fairly consistent evidence that
wages are rigid downward.
34See Akerlof, Dickens and Perry (1996) and Card and Hyslop (1996).
35A spike is not su±cient because rounding in the data makes occurrences of zero-dollar wage
changes common. It is not necessary since truncated workers may be laid o®. As far as skewness is
concerned, downward rigidities may also a®ect the upper tail of the distribution if employers limit
other workers' salary increases to subsidize constrained workers.
24Net E®ects of In°ation
Viewed from the policymaker's perspective, the question is whether in°ation at
low rates is on net bene¯cial or detrimental. How low should the monetary authority
aim? At zero or something above that? Sand e®ects are clearly disruptive and rise
with in°ation, certainly wiping out the net bene¯ts from the grease e®ects when
in°ation is high. But how do they compare at low rates? Beyond the impact on
the price system's resource allocation mechanism, in°ation can interact with the tax
system, reducing the steady-state level of output. Furthermore, downward rigidity
at the micro level may not translate into higher unemployment when in°ation is
low, implying that the grease e®ects themselves could be small. This would occur if
the elasticity of demand for labor with respect to these distortions was low because
employers honor implicit insurance-style contracts and absorb °uctuations of costs
into pro¯ts. Finally, in°ation may have di®erent e®ects in di®erent environments.
Thus far (the simulations in Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry [1996] to the contrary),
scant evidence of sizable macro e®ects exists. Indeed, both Card and Hyslop (1996)
and Lebow, Saks and Wilson (1999) ¯nd little net unemployment impact from down-
ward wage rigidity under normal conditions. Groshen and Schweitzer (1999) estimate
that at the point where bene¯ts are maximized, for CPI in°ation around 2 1/2 percent,
the net impact of in°ation (grease minus sand) is positive but an order magnitude
smaller than the gross bene¯ts. They go on to estimate that raising in°ation from
zero to 4 percent would lower unemployment by less than 1/10 of 1 percentage point.
By contrast the net impact of raising in°ation from 4 percent to 8 percent would
add as much as 3/10 of 1 percentage point to the unemployment rate. Overall, these
results suggest that there is little labor market justi¯cation for raising real in°ation
beyond about 1 percent (using an unbiased measure of consumer prices) or raising
CPI in°ation beyond 2 percent.
However, variation in general productivity growth rates will a®ect the choice of
an optimal in°ation target and the resulting monetary policy. The Groshen and
25Schweitzer results are based on the labor productivity growth experience during the
sample period under study | that is, the 40 year period from 1957 to 1996. To under-
stand why productivity growth matters for in°ation targets, note that productivity
growth has e®ects that are similar to those of in°ation | it injects grease and sand
into wage setting. Because general productivity growth is even harder to gauge than
in°ation, it adds confusion (sand) in wage setting. Moreover, because productivity
growth raises average nominal wages, it adds grease to the labor market in the same
way as in°ation does.36 Thus, even though productivity growth appears as if it might
be unrelated to monetary policy instruments or targets, it a®ects optimal in°ation
goals. In particular, as productivity growth strengthens, the amount of grease and
sand in the labor market becomes greater, reducing the bene¯t of adding more in°a-
tion. Conversely, as productivity growth declines, the amount of grease and sand in
the labor market also falls, increasing the net bene¯t of in°ation.
As a ¯nal consideration, policymakers should bear in mind that studies of rigidi-
ties and shocks are necessarily speci¯c to a particular economy and time. None of
the papers cited provides comparative measures, even though, as we note above, dif-
ferences in institutions and exposure to shocks may have important implications for
policy. In particular, the studies implicitly treat shocks and rigidities as unchanged
during the course of the study. While this assumption is entirely appropriate for
the short run, it is certainly not true over the long run. Using short-run numbers
to derive long-run estimates could bias results. Indeed, of particular policy interest
are endogenous responses, such as the posited tendency for downward wage rigidity
to relax in the face of persistent low in°ation, lowering the grease bene¯ts of raising
in°ation, and lowering the optimal rate of in°ation. Similarly (but with contrasting
implications), if low positive in°ation rates were maintained with little uncertainty,
36From the ¯rm's point of view, productivity growth lowers overall lower unit labor costs. This
increases overall demand for workers, leading to generally higher wages. However, at any time some
workers are facing reduced demand for their skills relative to others. The higher is productivity
growth, the wider is the scope for employers of those workers to reduce unit labor costs without
lowering their nominal wages.
26some sand costs of in°ation might dissipate as ¯rms (no longer subject to stop-and-go
s h o c k s )w e r eb e t t e ra b l et op l a nf o rt h ef u t u r ea n dd i s t i n g u i s hb e t w e e nr e a la n dn o m -
inal shocks. Thus, if monetary policy has been the primary source of unpredictable
nominal shocks, then to the extent that the policy itself can become more stable, a
higher target level of in°ation is justi¯ed.
A related caveat is that international di®erences have not yet been studied rig-
orously. All cited studies of the grease e®ect rely on US data. Hence, for other
economies, the results must be considered suggestive, rather than de¯nitive. By con-
trast, sand e®ects have been studied in a wide spectrum of countries, albeit individu-
ally rather than comparatively. Ultimately, given their importance for the conduct of
sound monetary policy, comparative and longitudinal studies of shocks and rigidities
will constitute an important area for further research.
6P O L I C Y I M P L I C A T I O N S
What do we learn from our analysis? We began by noting that economies face
both real and nominal shocks and that prices and wages are rigid in response. These
rigidities may be asymmetrical (with decreases in prices and wages being more di±cult
to bring about than increases) or not. The implications for monetary policy are
manifold.
First, we have described how theoretical models help guide us in developing mea-
sures of trend in°ation. These models suggest that trimmed means are more e±cient,
timely measures of core in°ation than the more commonly used indexes that system-
atically exclude certain components such as food and energy. Second, the research we
have surveyed suggests that in°ation is very di±cult to control accurately, especially
at short horizons. This explains why, in designing policy schemes, many central banks
and governments have reconsidered the wisdom of adopting narrow in°ation-targeting
bands. Staying inside the bands may turn out to be an impossible task, damaging
27the credibility of the authorities that put the policy in place.
Finally, we address the question of how to select an optimal in°ation target. We
note that when prices adjust infrequently, in°ation distorts price signals and leads to
resource misallocations. But if wages and prices are rigid downward, some amount of
in°ation facilitates adjustment to real shocks. Recent research has produced measures
of the relative size of these costs and bene¯ts in an economy that suggest that in°ation
targets between zero and 2 percent (bias-adjusted) are optimal.
But there are two important caveats. First, to the extent that labor productivity
is increasing on average, there is room to reduce the in°ation target. Second, the
optimal rate of in°ation depends on the mixture of shocks and rigidities to which
an economy is subject. Furthermore, a long-run steady rate of low in°ation implies
fewer nominal shocks and puts pressure on price and wage setters to reduce rigidities.
Thus, the optimal rate of in°ation may both di®er somewhat across countries and
evolve over time.
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